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CREATING A 21ST CENTURY OLIGARCHY: JUDICIAL ABDICATION TO CLASS ACTION
MEDIATORS
James R. Coben*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is becoming a matter of routine for federal and state judges to cite the
involvement of a private mediator as evidence that bargaining in a class action case was
conducted at arms-length and without collusion between the parties. In many cases, class
action mediators offer up testimony about the nature of the bargaining, as well as
subjective (and most often summary) opinions on the merits of the settlements they
helped to broker. This article argues that this approach to mediator participation (and
haphazard delivery and uncritical acceptance of mediator evidence) is an abdication of
judicial fiduciary duty to ensure that proposed class action settlements are fair to absent
class members.
Repeating the mantra that participation of a private mediator in the negotiating
process ensures that the proceedings are free of collusion or undue pressure does not
make it so. Moreover, should we really ignore the conflict of interest concerns when a
mediator testifies about the quality of the bargaining or the merits of a settlement in the
context of seeking court approval of the same? Unfortunately, repetition, not reasoned
analysis, has characterized court opinion-writing on this topic. In fact, courts offer no
reasoning to explain their practices. The one consistent theme to be inferred from the
class action mediation cases is that courts view class action mediators as members of a
small, elite club of highly experienced neutrals. “Club membership” alone seems to be
the foundation for the now routine presumptions made about the benefits of mediatorbrokered class action settlements.
Nearly three decades ago, Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth described the “very
select and elite group of individuals”1 eligible to serve as international arbitrators:
They are purportedly selected for their “virtue”  judgment, neutrality,
expertise  yet rewarded as if they are participants in international dealmaking. In more sociological terms, the symbolic capital acquired through
a career of public service or scholarship is translated into a substantial cash
value in international arbitration.2
Arguably, this same mantle has been passed to the elite group of class action mediators.
And the symbolic power that led to their selection by disputing parties has fostered
especially lazy judicial reasoning, and unjustified judicial deference in a context where
* Professor of Law and Senior Fellow, Dispute Resolution Institute, Hamline University School of
Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Nancy Welsh, as well as my co-presenters
Jennifer Reynolds, Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, and Jeffrey Stempel at the February 22, 2013 Penn State
University Symposium, at which the thesis of this article was first presented.
1
YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 8 (1996).
2
Id.
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vulnerable third parties (class members not at the bargaining table) deserve better from
our judicial system.
One solution: Insist that class action mediators be appointed as special masters
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 (or state equivalent) and formalize their
reporting obligations to the court. Arguably, the formal appointment would extend to the
mediator the same fiduciary obligation to protect the interests of absent class members
that the court itself holds, a fiduciary duty that private mediators do not have.
II. CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT: A UNIQUE MEDIATION CONTEXT
In most mediated general civil cases, the parties’ settlement ends the initial
litigation without judicial review or approval of the agreement. 3 Except in the minority of
jurisdictions mandating court review,4 or those few extraordinary situations where
ongoing court supervision is needed in the form of a consent decree, plaintiffs typically
dismiss their cases with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) (or its
state equivalent), and the parties’ settlement agreement is a new contract, that if breached
is the starting point for an entirely new lawsuit – an enforcement action.5
Settlements of class actions require a much different path to finality. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(e) directs that class actions may be settled “only with court
approval.”6 Moreover, the same rule mandates that class members should receive notice
of the settlement,7 and that it will be approved “only after a hearing and on finding that it
is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”8
Though there are variations by circuit,9 courts generally evaluate a number of
factors to determine whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. They include:
3

See generally SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 7:19 (2012); Peter
N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-connected Mediation--Tension Between the
Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 509 (2004).
4
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-308 (1991) (providing that a mediated agreement is not
enforceable unless “reduced to writing and approved by the parties and their attorneys, if any . . . presented
to the court . . . , as a stipulation and, . . . approved by the court”). Legislatively mandated court review is
far more likely in the family law context. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(c) (1985) (providing that in
domestic mediations, a mediated agreement is not admissible unless it is in writing, signed by the parties
and their attorneys, and approved by the court); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619, subd. 7 (2001) (providing
that mediated child custody agreements “may not be presented to the court nor made enforceable unless the
parties and their counsel, if any, consent to its presentation to the court, and the court adopts the
agreement.”).
5
See generally COLE ET AL., supra note 3, at § 7:1.
6
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (providing that “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be
settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”).
7
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1).
8
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
9
See, e.g., Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 632, 639 n.11 (5th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S.Ct. 317 (2012) (listing six factors as “(1) the existence of fraud or collusion behind the
settlement; (2) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the stage of the
proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the probability of plaintiffs' success on the merits;
(5) the range of possible recovery; and (6) the opinions of the class counsel, class representatives, and
absent class members,” (citing Reed v. General Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983))); WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 117 (2d Cir. 2005) cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1044 (2005)
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1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

likelihood of recovery, or likelihood of success;
amount and nature of discovery or evidence;
settlement terms and conditions;
recommendation and experience of counsel;
future expense and likely duration of litigation;
recommendation of neutral parties, if any;
number of objectors and nature of objections; and
the presence of good faith and the absence of collusion.10

The primary goal is to protect those class members “whose rights may not have
been given due regard by the negotiating parties.”11 According to the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless,12 trial courts act “as fiduciaries for the absent
class members”13 and the requirement for judicial approval “ensure[s] that other
unrepresented parties (absent class members) and the public interest are fairly treated by
the settlement reached between the class representatives and the defendants.”14
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has described this judicial intrusion into
“what is otherwise a private consensual agreement negotiated between the parties to a
lawsuit” as necessarily limited.15 The inquiry seeks to “reach a reasoned judgment that
the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the
negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and
adequate to all concerned.”16
The inquiry of collusion is concerned both with “overt misconduct by the
negotiators” as well as “incentives for the negotiators to pursue their own self-interest
and that of certain class members,”17 incentives that are “implicit in the circumstances
(listing nine factors as “(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation;(2) the reaction of
the class to the settlement;(3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed;(4) the
risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages;(6) the risks of maintaining the class
action through the trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of
reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; (9) the range of reasonableness
of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation,” (citing City of
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir.1974))); Churchill Village, LLC v. Gen. Elec., 361
F.3d 566, 575-576 (9th Cir. 2004) (listing eight factors as “(1) the strength of the plaintiffs' case; (2) the
risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action
status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and
the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental
participant; and (8) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement,” (citing Hanlon v.
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998))).
10
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., 4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:43 (4th ed. 2008) [hereafter
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS].
11
Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir.1982)
(noting that “[t]he class action device, while capable of the fair and efficient adjudication of a large number
of claims, is also susceptible to abuse and carries with it certain inherent structural risks.”).
12
Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590 (3d Cir. 2010).
13
Id. at 593.
14
Id. at 594.
15
Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 625.
16
Id.
17
Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 960 (9th Cir. 2003).
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and can influence the result of the negotiations without any explicit expression or secret
cabals.”18
That said, the examination takes place in the shadow of “a strong public policy…
which is particularly muscular in class action suits, favoring settlement of disputes,
finality of judgments and the termination of litigation.”19 Thus, courts generally presume
that a proposed settlement is fair and reasonable when it is the result of arm’s-length
negotiations.20 There is also a presumption that no fraud or collusion occurred between
counsel, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.21
Very little has been written in secondary sources about the involvement of
mediators in this unique settlement environment. The sparse available commentary
encourages mediators to be actively involved in seeking approval for the settlements they
broker22 – a perspective quite different than the typical way a mediator’s work is
defined.23 In 2002, attorney Richard Seymour opined in a book chapter that:
The mediator can provide a direct response to class members claiming
improper collusion between the plaintiffs and the defendant in the
settlement by testifying to the arms-length character of the negotiations
and the vigor with which the parties pursued their competing goals.24
This recommended “strategic” use of mediator testimony promotes an alliance of the
mediator and named parties – against outsiders – that is clearly at odds with the court’s
duty to act as a fiduciary to protect the outsiders’ interests. It is especially troubling that
such testimony is encouraged only in the face of class objections, rather than as a matter
of routine in every case. A classic example is the mediator affidavit presented to the court
in Lipuma v. American Express Co.:25
3. It has come to my attention that counsel for a purported class member
has alleged that counsel for the parties “colluded” in reaching the
settlement. I submit this affidavit to specifically address those allegations.

18

Id.
Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 593 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
20
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 10, at § 11:41.
21
Id. at § 11:51.
22
See, e.g., Richard T. Seymour, Mediating Class Actions: A Plaintiff Lawyer’s View, in HOW ADR
WORKS 389-411 (Norman Brand ed. 2002); Margaret L. Shaw & Linda R. Singer, Settlement, PostSettlement, and More: Issues in Mediating Class Action Cases, 23 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 61
(2005).
23
See, e.g., UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 7 (2001) (prohibiting mediator reports to the court except under
limited circumstances). See also In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 157 n. 44 (Bkrtcy. D. Del. 2011)
(rejecting party invitation to “accord special consideration to the fact that the mediation was conducted by
my colleague, Judge Gross, whose skills as a mediator are highly respected and much sought after” and
emphasizing that “[m]ediations are confidential by custom and under local rule. [citation omitted]. Later
assessment of the quality of the mediation, by whomever conducted—absent some identifiable impropriety
(and the record here reflects none)—is antithetical to the purpose and atmosphere intended to be created to
enable parties to engage in such discussions.”).
24
Seymour, supra note 22, at 392.
25
Lipuma v. Am. Express Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
19
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Based on my observations as mediator, such allegations are entirely
baseless. I observed no signs of collusion or unethical conduct.
4. It is my observation that Defendants and Plaintiffs were represented by
highly competent, reputable and ethical counsel who negotiated
vigorously and at arms-length for their respective party's interests.26
Use of the passive voice to begin the affidavit is particularly telling. The mediator had, of
course, per Seymour’s advice, been recruited by the negotiating parties to defend the
settlement he brokered.
Margaret Shaw and Linda Singer likewise argued in 2005 that, “mediators can
provide valuable information at the fairness hearing on subjects outside of the substance
of the confidential negotiations.”27 They observed, quite accurately indeed, that “with
increasing frequency, the parties or the court may want the mediator to testify at the
fairness hearing,”28 and they offered examples of their own testimony, including evidence
“concerning the way in which class representatives were selected, the number of
meetings held, the efforts to communicate with absent class members, and the lack of
collusion”29 (as detailed in section III.B. infra, mediators frequently also opine on the
quality of the settlement reached).
When such testimony is “undertaken with the permission—and often the active
encouragement—of all the parties,” Shaw and Singer argued, “it does not constitute a
breach of confidentiality.”30 This view is apparently widely shared by judges, given that
the word “confidentiality” virtually never appears in class action mediation decisions.31
This same exception to confidentiality is consistent with the Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators, which provides that “[a] mediator shall maintain the
confidentiality of all information obtained by the mediator in mediation, unless otherwise
agreed to by the parties or required by applicable law” (emphasis added).32 A number of
state confidentiality statutes likewise authorize disclosure with party consent.33
However, the Uniform Mediation Act (UMA), (now enacted in ten states and the
District of Columbia) expressly prohibits mediator reports to a court with authority to
make a ruling on the dispute that is the subject of the mediation,34 with exceptions limited
26

Id. at 1306.
Shaw & Singer, supra note 22, at 72.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
A rare exception is a 2000 opinion from the Federal Court for the Middle District of Florida, Diaz v.
Hillsborough Cnty. Hosp. Auth., No. 8:90–CV–120–T–25B, 2000 WL 1682918 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2000),
where the court took pains to emphasize that the mediator’s report protected “the confidentiality of the
substance of mediation discussions,” notwithstanding its conclusion “that the mediation participants each
were acting as zealous advocates for the interests of the party they represented . . . . [and] the product of
the mediation process is a proposed Consent Decree that provides meaningful monetary and equitable relief
to class members.” Id. at *6.
32
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard V(A) (2005).
33
See, e.g., VIRGINIA CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.9 (2002) (stating that “[t]he neutral shall not disclose
information exchanged or observations regarding the conduct and demeanor of the parties and their counsel
during the dispute resolution proceeding, unless the parties otherwise agree.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-43103(c)(i) (1991) (no privilege if “[a]ll the parties involved provide written consent to disclose.”).
34
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 7(a) (2001).
27
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to “whether mediation occurred or has terminated, whether a settlement was reached, and
attendance.”35 Courts are prohibited from considering evidence submitted in violation of
the prohibition;36 however, there are no sanctions for a mediator who makes reports.37
While parties are free to waive the evidentiary privileges provided under the UMA,38
such waivers do not apply to the prohibitions on mediator reports to the court, raising at
least a theoretical barrier to the practice.39
III. THE ILLUSION OF TRUTH: PROOF VIA REPEATED ASSERTION
“Statements repeated even once are rated as truer or more valid than
statements heard for the first time, an effect called the illusion of truth.”
(Wesley G. Moons, Diane M. Mackie & Teresa Garcia-Marqueset).40
A. Mediator Participation as Proof of Non-collusive, Arms-Length Bargaining
In 1989, a federal district court judge in the Eastern District of New York41
approved a mediated class action settlement of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO) suit,42 alleging that a public utility repeatedly testified falsely to
the public utilities commission about a nuclear power plant’s construction status and
anticipated commercial operation date. According to the class action plaintiffs (including
the County of Suffolk, five individual rate payers, and a local business), this false
testimony resulted in unwarranted and excessive utility rate increases.43 In describing the
facilitated negotiations leading to the settlement, the trial judge observed:
There is nothing to indicate that the settlement process itself was tainted
by collusion or undue pressure by the defendants upon class
representatives and counsel. Prior to certification of the class, the court
was informed by the parties on a regular basis of the progress of
settlement talks. Both sides were possessed of formidable negotiating
skills and significant bargaining power, and negotiations were conducted
at arm's length. The court observed nothing to suggest otherwise.
Additionally, an impartial mediator was appointed by the court at the
35

Id. at § 7(b).
Id. at § 7(c).
37
COLE ET AL., supra note 3, at § 8:40.
38
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 3(c) (2001) (providing that “[i]f the parties agree in advance in a signed
record, or a record of proceeding reflects agreement by the parties, that all or part of a mediation is not
privileged, the privileges under Sections 4 through 6 do not apply to the mediation or part agreed upon.”).
39
Id. The § 3(c) waiver provisions are silent about any impact on the § 7 limitations on mediator
reports to the court. See also COLE ET AL., supra note 3, at § 8:40.
40
Wesley G. Moons, Diane M. Mackie & Teresa Garcia-Marques, The Impact of Repetition-Induced
Familiarity on Agreement With Weak and Strong Arguments, 96 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 32,
32 (2009).
41
Cnty. of Suffolk v. Alcorn, 710 F. Supp. 1428 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd in relevant part, 907 F.2d 1295
(2d Cir. 1990).
42
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006).
43
Cnty. of Suffolk, 907 F.2d at 1299-1300.
36
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request of the parties to assist in the settlement discussions. The
participation of the court-appointed mediator in the negotiating process
helped ensure that the proceedings were free of collusion or undue
pressure.”44
That last sentence is effectively “patient zero” in what has evolved into a unique, and
very common, form of judicial deference.
Over the last three decades, and with increasing frequency, judges assert that the
involvement of a mediator in class action mediations is proof that the resulting
settlements were negotiated free of collusion and fraud. To document this phenomena, I
searched the Westlaw databases “ALLFEDS” and “ALLSTATES” for the terms “‘class
action’ & ‘mediat!’”. The vast majority of the resulting “hits”45 were simply cases where
the court described a procedural posture that included the fact that a class action was
mediated (successfully or not). However, in over 200 of the cases, judges cited the use of
mediation in support of a conclusion about class action settlement approval. A significant
increase in this phenomenon, roughly a tripling, occurred in 2007 (see Table 1 below).
Most likely, this increase is attributable to the 2005 Congressional enactment of the Class
Action Fairness Act,46 designed to “federalize” class actions.47 Indeed, according to a
2008 report of the Federal Judicial Center, federal class action diversity filings increased
nearly three-fold in 2006-2007.48

44

Cnty. of Suffolk, 710 F. Supp. at 1436-1437 (emphasis added).
The search yielded 2,847 “hits” in the ALLFEDS database and 623 “hits” in the ALLSTATES
database.
46
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (now codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)).
47
See generally Patricia Hatamyar Moore, Confronting the Myth of “State Court Class Action Abuses”
Through an Understanding of Heuristics and a Plea for More Statistics, 82 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2013),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2238174 (describing CAFA goals and providing an detailed critique
of the “mythology” of state class action abuses so routinely cited in support of the Act).
48
EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 6–9 (2008).
45
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Year
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

# of Cases
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
8
5
7
7

Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

# of Cases
3
8
3
11
9
27
28
20
31
28
38
649

Table 1: Cases Where Judges Cited Mediation to Support An Opinion on
Whether or Not to Approve a Class Action Settlement50
Perhaps most surprising about this collection of opinions is how consistently
succinct (and conclusory) the courts’ comments are about mediation. County of Suffolk’s
single sentence about what mediation “ensured” is replicated more or less consistently,
though with different degrees of confidence. For example, in the Southern District of
New York, federal district judges frequently state that “[t]he assistance of an experienced
mediator . . . reinforces that the Settlement Agreement is non-collusive.”51
Other judges state an agreement is entitled a “presumption of fairness [where a
mediator facilitated arm’s length negotiations]”52 or that the same warrants “[a]
presumption that the settlement achieved meets the requirements of due process.”53
49

Year-to-date total as of March 19, 2013.
Table 1 includes cases where judges merely asserted that mediation participation was (or, in rare
cases, was not) proof of arms-length bargaining and lack of collusion and fraud, as well as cases where
judges quoted detailed mediator testimony (affidavit, declaration, or by deposition) on the quality of the
bargaining and the merits of the settlement reached.
51
Diaz v. E. Locating Serv. Inc., No. 10 CIV 4082 JCF, 2010 WL 2945556, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 22,
2010) (emphasis added). See also Toure v. Amerigroup Corp., No. 10 CIV. 5391 RLM, 2012 WL 1432302,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2012) (stating that “[t]he assistance of an experienced mediator, Linda Singer,
Esq., reinforces that the Settlement Agreement is non-collusive.”); Matheson v. T-Bone Rest., LLC, No. 09
Civ. 4214(DAB), 2011 WL 6402303, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2011) (stating that “[t]he assistance of an
experienced mediator, Carol Wittenberg, reinforces that the Settlement Agreement is non-collusive”);
deMunecas v. Bold Food, LLC, No. 09 CIV. 00440, 2010 WL 2399345, at *1 (S.D. N.Y. Apr. 19, 2010)
(stating that “[t]he assistance of an experienced mediator, Ruth D. Raisfeld, reinforces that the Settlement
Agreement is non-collusive.”); Mohney v. Shelly's Prime Steak, Stone Crab & Oyster Bar, No. 06 Civ.
4270, 2008 WL 7863650, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2008) (stating that “[t]he assistance of an experienced
mediator, Carol Wittenberg, reinforces that the Settlement Agreement is non-collusive.”)
52
In re Giant Interactive Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 279 F.R.D. 151, 159–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (emphasis
added).
53
Guaman v. Ajna-Bar NYC, No. 12 Civ. 2987(DF), 2013 WL 445896, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2013)
(emphasis added). See also Castagna v. Madison Square Garden, L.P., No. 09–cv–10211 (LTS)(HP), 2011
50
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Some courts explain that reaching settlement in mediation “suggest[s]”54 that the
settlement agreement was reached through arm’s length negotiations and without
collusion. Alternatively, courts state that involvement of an experienced and well known
mediator is a “strong indicator of procedural fairness”55 or “further proof” of procedural
fairness.56 A 2001 decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals borrowed the
formulation from the 1989 County of Suffolk decision when declaring that “a courtappointed mediator's involvement in pre-certification settlement negotiations helps to
ensure that the proceedings were free of collusion and undue pressure.”57
I concede these “conservative” presumptions might well be reasonable (even
though the rationale is unarticulated) given the relatively low bar for class action
settlement review overall. But courts often take a much bolder approach. For example, in
Bert v. AK Steel Corp.,58 a judge in the Middle District of the Ohio federal district court
stated that “the participation of an independent mediator in settlement negotiations
virtually insures that the negotiations were conducted at arm's length and without
collusion between the parties.”59 Courts in New Jersey have repeated the “virtually
insures” approach60 and also deemed use of a mediator to be “persuasive evidence that
the negotiations were hard-fought, arms-length affairs.”61
Moving to the opposite coast and half-way across the Pacific, courts in California
and Hawaii have gone so far as to hold that “[t]he assistance of an experienced mediator
in the settlement process confirms that the settlement is non-collusive.”62 And in In re
WL 2208614, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2011) (stating that “[a]rm's-length negotiations involving counsel
and a mediator raise a presumption that the settlement they achieved meets the requirements of due
process.”); Clark v. Ecolab Inc., Nos. 07CIV.8623, 04CIV.4488, 06CIV.5672, 2010 WL 1948198, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2010) (stating the same); McMahon v. Olivier Cheng Catering and Events, LLC, No. 08
CIV. 8713, 2010 WL 2399328, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2010) (stating the same); Khait v. Whirlpool Corp.,
No. 06-6381 (ALC), 2010 WL 2025106, at *5 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 20, 2010) (stating the same).
54
See, e.g., Vincent v. Reser, No. C 11–03572 CRB, 2013 WL 621865, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2013)
(noting that “there is no indication that the Settlement is the product of collusion among the negotiating
parties. Rather, the parties reached the Proposed Settlement after two days of mediation under the
supervision of an experienced and neutral mediator, and subsequent negotiations between counsel with the
aid of said mediator. These factors strongly suggest that the settlement agreement was reached through
arm's length negotiations.”) (emphasis added).
55
Morris v. Affinity Health Plan, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 611, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that “[t]he
involvement of Ruth D. Raisfeld, Esq., an experienced and well-known employment and class action
mediator, is also a strong indicator of procedural fairness.”) (emphasis added).
56
In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC, No. 00 CIV. 6689 (SAS), 2003 WL 22244676, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2003) (stating that “the fact that the Settlement was reached after exhaustive arm's-length
negotiations, with the assistance of a private mediator experienced in complex litigation, is further proof
that it is fair and reasonable.”) (emphasis added).
57
D'Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
58
Bert v. AK Steel Corp., No. 1:02-CV-467, 2008 WL 4693747 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2008).
59
Id. at *2. See also Hainey v. Parrot, 617 F. Supp. 2d 668, 673 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (noting that “[t]he
participation of an independent mediator in the settlement negotiations virtually assures that the
negotiations were conducted at arm's length and without collusion between the parties.”) (emphasis added).
60
Larson v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. CIV.A. 07-5325 (JLL), 2010 WL 234934, at *11 (D.N.J. Jan. 15,
2010) (quoting Bert, 2008 WL 4693747, at *2).
61
Milliron v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 08-4149, 2009 WL 3345762, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2009)
(emphasis added).
62
Satchell v. Fed. Express Corp., Nos. C03-2659 SI, C 03-2878 SI, 2007 WL 1114010, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Apr.13, 2007) (emphasis added); Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, Local 142 v. C. Brewer and
Col, Ltd., No. CIV. CV0600260SOMLEK, 2007 WL 4145228, at *2 (D. Haw. Nov. 20, 2007). See also
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Electronic Data Systems Corp. "ERISA'' Litigation,63 the Texas federal district court
noted that the settlement “was the product of extensive negotiations coordinated by one
of the nation's most respected mediators” leading to the conclusion “that there is not even
a hint of fraud or collusion between the parties in the proposed settlement.”64
In stark contrast to this consistently positive (and in virtually all cases, extremely
summary) description of the mediation process, a 2002 case from the Eastern District of
Missouri paints a dramatically different picture when the mediation process is overtly
attacked by class objectors. In In re BankAmerica Corp. Securities Litigation, 65 the court
rejected arguments about mediation impropriety but nonetheless refused to approve a
proposed mediated settlement in a securities fraud class action arising out of the merger
of North Carolina and Delaware banking corporations because the settlement was not fair
to a particular subgroup of class members.
The court first emphasized that mediation had occurred “without the Court’s
knowledge.”66 In response to the objectors’ allegation that class counsel was “strongarmed” by the mediator, the court again observed that it “had no involvement in the
mediation and, in fact, was unaware of the mediation until informed of its proceedings by
the parties.”67 More importantly, the judge emphasized that he “has been involved as
a mediator hundreds of times and is aware that mediators utilize different tactics to bring
the parties to compromise.”68 In the court’s view, the plaintiffs were “not bound by any
suggestions that may have been made by the mediator, but instead freely chose to enter
the proposed settlement agreement,”69 which the court deemed fair, reasonable and
adequate.
The court went on to also dismiss the argument that the lead plaintiffs were “shut
out of the mediation before the moment of settlement,”70 refused to “stand in judgment of
the mediator’s decision to conduct a portion of the mediation with . . . class counsel
alone,”71 and refused to engage in a “he said, she said” argument about comments made
during mediation.72 The court summarily dismissed the class action objectors’ proffer of
a declaration by legal ethics Professor Geoffrey Hazard (now emeritus professor at the
University of Pennsylvania) critiquing the mediation process, concluding that “Professor
Hazard, like the Court, was not present at the mediation and thus is in no position to
judge the conduct of the mediator based on the ‘he said’ of one of the mediation’s
participants.”73

Nguyen v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, No. C 10-02257 SI, 2012 WL 1677054, at *3 (N.D. Cal. April 20, 2012)
(stating that the court “also relies on the fact that the settlement was reached only after significant arms'
length negotiations in multiple sessions with a nationally recognized mediator.”).
63
In re Elec. Data Systems Corp. "ERISA'' Litig., No. 6:03-MD-1512, 6:03-CV-126, 2005 WL
1875545 (E.D. Tex. June 30, 2005).
64
Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
65
See In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 694 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
66
Id. at 699.
67
Id. at 705.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 706.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 706 n.7.
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Of course the latter point about the absence of the judge in class action mediations
is true in virtually every case;74 yet the same inability to “judge” what transpired in the
mediation room is not mentioned once in the numerous cases citing mediation as
“evidence” of the positive nature of the bargaining that transpired there. Here, there is a
judicial deference of another kind – a distinct unwillingness to probe or in any way
second guess the mediation process.
B. The Unassailability of Mediator Opinion on Settlement Quality
Class action mediators frequently go far beyond the examples of evidence
Margaret Shaw and Linda Singer offer from their own cases (where they offered
testimony “concerning the way in which class representatives were selected, the number
of meetings held, the efforts to communicate with absent class members, and the lack of
collusion”).75 Instead, mediators routinely offer opinion about the merits of the settlement
the mediators helped to broker. For example, the mediator declaration in Sobel v. Hertz
Corp.,76 a 2011 case from the federal District of Nevada, included the observation that
the “innovative” settlement package “is well-tailored to the strengths and weaknesses of
all parties’ positions.”77
Most commonly, mediators declare their settlement “fair and reasonable” and “in
the best interest of the class.”78 One court described such testimony as weighing heavily
74

One notable exception is Green v. Am. Express Co., 200 F.R.D. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). There, the
court brokered the settlement as mediator, subsequently approved the settlement, and also ruled that the
class action settlement notice to class members required by FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1) was unwarranted. In
the court’s words:
As I presided over the mediation, I was privy to the arms-length negotiations and both parties’ zealous
advocacy for their respective client. Secondly, the settlement agreement provides only for injunctive
relief and there is no possibility for the named plaintiff to benefit from this settlement at the expense
of the other class members. Furthermore, as there are over one million class members, the $500,000
cap on TILA [Truth-in-Lending Act] damages could, at best, provide each class member with less
than postage, and the cost of notice, to say nothing of the postage, would jeopardize, and likely
destroy, the hard fought settlement agreement that the parties have presented to this Court. Id. at 212.
75
Shaw & Singer, supra note 22, at 72.
76
Sobel v. Hertz Corp., No. 3:06–CV–00545–LRH–RAM, 2011 WL 2559565 (D. Nev. June 27,
2011).
77
Id. at *14.
78
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 957 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting mediator
Daniel Weinstein’s declaration that the settlement “was arrived at through arm's length negotiations by
counsel who were skilled and knowledgeable about the facts and law of this case,” and it was “fair,
reasonable and adequate in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses and the risks of
establishing liability and damages.”); Bredthauer v. Lundstrom, No. 4:10CV3132, 4:10CV3139,
8:10CV326, 2012 WL 4904422, at *5 (D. Neb. Oct. 12, 2012) (citing mediator’s affidavit that “the
settlement was fair and reasonable”); CompSource Oklahoma v. BNY Mellon, N.A., No. CIV 08-469KEW, 2012 WL 6864701, at *8 (E.D. Okla. Oct. 25, 2012) (citing opinion of the mediator, a former
Oklahoma Federal Judge and United States Attorney, that Class Counsel’s request for a 25% fee was “fair
and reasonable under the specific facts and circumstances of this case”); Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC,
717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 56 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting mediator’s opinion that “the settlement is fair and
reasonable” and stating that “[t]he opinion of the mediator and experienced Class Counsel weigh in favor
of approving the settlement agreement”); Browning v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C04-01463 HRL, 2007 WL
4105971, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2007) (describing the settlement as “the product of mediation by a
qualified and experienced lawyer, Rodney A. Max, who reported that the case was ‘professionally,
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in favor of settlement approval because it came from the “‘front lines’ of the settlement
discussions between the class plaintiffs and the Covered Defendants and their respective
insurance carriers.”79
In some cases, trial courts simply note that mediators approved the settlement;80
in others, the mediators actively advocate for approval of it.81 Thus, for example, in In re
Marsh ERISA Litigation,82 the trial judge noted that the mediator “has submitted a
declaration in strong support of the Settlement” and quoted the following declaration
excerpt:
[B]ased on my knowledge of this action, all of the materials provided to
me, the efforts of counsel, the intensity of the negotiations, the litigation
risks, and the benefits reached in the proposed settlement, I believe that
this is a fair, reasonable and adequate settlement . . . , and I respectfully
recommend that it be approved by the District Court.83
“In light of the foregoing,” reasoned the Court, there is “no reason to doubt that the
Settlement is procedurally fair.”84
Mediators have opined that the settlement is an “excellent result” for the class.85
Mediator Kenneth Feinberg went so far as to declare in In re Literary Works in
ethically, and reasonably mediated, negotiated and resolved’ and noting that the “mediator recommended
the settlement to the Court as being ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’”); In re Visa Check/Mastermoney
Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 509 -510 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting mediator Eric Green’s declaration
that “it is my opinion that the [S]ettlement[s] w[ere] achieved through a fair and reasonable process and
[are] in the best interest of the class .... the court system and the mediation process worked exactly as they
are supposed to work at their best; a consensual resolution was achieved based on full information and
honest negotiation between well-represented and evenly balanced parties.”).
79
Jane Doe 30's Mother v. Bradley, C.A. Nos. N10C–05–023 JRS, N10C–10–317 JRS, 2012 WL
5949216, at *13 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2012).
80
See, e.g., Brazil v. Dell Inc., No. C–07–01700 RMW, 2012 WL 1144303, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4,
2012) (noting that “[t]he requested award amount was approved by mediator Randall Wulff, which serves
as ‘independent confirmation that the fee was not the result of collusion or a sacrifice of the interests of the
class.’”).
81
See, e.g., Stratton v. Glacier Ins. Adm'rs, Inc., No. 1:02-CV-06213 OWW DLB, 2007 WL 274423,
at *14 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2007) (noting mediator support for the proposed settlement and encouragement
that the court approve it); Dunk v. Ford Motor Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483, 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(emphasizing that “[t]he independent mediator, a retired superior court judge and appellate justice with
substantial experience and respect in the legal community, recommended the settlement.”).
82
In re Marsh ERISA Litig., 265 F.R.D. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
83
Id. at 141.
84
Id.
85
See, e.g., In re Lawnmower Engine Horsepower Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 733 F. Supp. 2d 997,
1007 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (citing mediator’s declaration “describing the contentiousness of the mediation
sessions” and stating “that he became very familiar with the legal, factual and procedural issues in this case,
and in his opinion the global settlement is an ‘excellent result’ for the class.”); In re Adelphia Commc’ns
Corp. Sec. and Derivative Litig., No. 03 CIV.5761, 03 CIV.5771, 03 CIV.5755, 03 CIV.5764, 03
CIV.5776, 03 MDL 1529 LMM, 03 CIV.5758, 03 CIV.5768, 03 CIV.5781, 03 CIV.5785, 03 CIV.5759, 03
CIV.5769, 03 CIV.5790, 03 CIV.5762, 03 CIV.5774, 03 CIV.5756, 03 CIV.5765, 03 CIV.5778, 03
CIV.5783, 03 CIV.5757, 03 CIV.5766, 03 CIV.5786, 03 CIV.5760, 03 CIV.5770, 03 CIV.5791, 03
CIV.5763, 03 CIV.5775, 03 CIV.5780, 03 CIV.5792, 03 CIV.5784, 03 CIV.5787, 2006 WL 3378705, at *2
n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006) (noting that the mediator, “a former Judge of the California Superior Court
and an experienced mediator, has described the mediation as contentious, extensive, difficult and hard-
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Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation,86 that the parties’ comprehensive settlement
was the “fairest resolution which could be obtained.”87
Feinberg is by no means the only mediator opining that the parties’ settlement
was the best possible under the circumstances.88 He is however, the only one to my
knowledge, who has had to disavow an affidavit opining about the reasonableness of a
settlement, albeit not one issued in his capacity as a mediator. 89 Instead, in the notorious
Fen-Phen litigation, one of the worst cases of attorney fraud in U.S. history, Feinberg
issued his affidavit in his capacity as an expert in mass tort litigation, and later retracted it
in a subsequent ethics case against one of the lawyers, reportedly telling the disciplinary
judge that his affidavit was based solely on misinformation provided by one of the
disbarred attorneys.90 The case certainly is a cautionary tale for anyone believing that
third parties in mediation necessarily have all the information they need to opine
accurately on the quality of the parties’ agreement.91

fought . . . and as resulting in ‘an excellent result for the class.’”).
86
In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2011).
87
Id. at 263. See discussion infra at notes 197200 and accompanying text.
88
See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 467, 471, 480, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(approving $586 million settlement of 309 securities class actions as fair, reasonable, and adequate, and
deeming reasonable an attorney fee of one-third of the net settlement fund, where the two mediators that
assisted the parties “both attested that the settlement ‘was fully negotiated, was the best that the settlement
classes could obtain, and is fair, adequate and reasonable to the members of the classes.’”); Nilsen v. York
Cnty., 382 F. Supp. 2d 206, 214 (D. Me. 2005) (stating that “[b]oth the mediator and York County's
‘regular outside counsel’ report that the monetary award represents the maximum amount that the plaintiffs
could have obtained in a settlement, and the outside counsel states that York County would have abandoned
settlement efforts if the plaintiffs had rejected the $3.3 million offer.”).
89
See Debra Cassens Weiss, Ken Feinberg’s Retracted Affidavit Cited in Appeals Ruling Favoring
FenPhen Lawyers, ABA JOURNAL LEGAL NEWS NOW (Feb. 18, 2011),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ken_feinbergs_retracted_affidavit_cited_in_appeals_ruling_favori
ng_fen-phen/.
90
Id.
91
In 2005, similar concerns led the Wisconsin Legislature to delete a statutory requirement that family
mediators “certify that the written mediation agreement is in the best interest of the child based on the
information presented to the mediator” (a mandate formerly codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(12)
(2005)). See 2005-2006 WISC. LEGIS. SERV. ACT 443 (2005 S.B. 123) § 57 (renumbering § 767.11 to
become § 767.405 and amending subsections 2-14). A legislative note accompanying the amendment
states:
Deletes current requirement that the mediator certify that the written mediation agreement
is “in the best interest of the child” based on the information presented to the mediator.
Reflects concern that a mediator, in general, does not have the expertise necessary, or
sufficient knowledge of the information presented, to certify that the agreement is in the
best interest of the child. The mediator will still be required to certify that the written
mediation agreement accurately reflects the agreement made between the parties. Id.

174

IV. THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES: IMPLIED (AND UNCONVINCING) RATIONALES
FOR DEFERENCE
“Blind faith, no matter how passionately expressed, will not suffice.”
(Edward O. Wilson)92
Judges readily cite the participation of mediators as “proof” that class action
bargaining was at arms-length and thus free of collusion and fraud. Moreover, judges
seem quite willing to uncritically accept the mediator’s pronouncement that the
settlement terms themselves were fair and reasonable under the circumstances. Yet, none
of the more than 200 cases I have found bother to provide any explicit reasoning to
defend these practices. Into this vacuum, I offer up a number of possibilities at least
implied by the decisions. None, in my view, are terribly persuasive rationales for the
sweeping set of assumptions about the benefits of class action mediation routinely
claimed by the courts.
A. The Party Choice to Mediate
A number of cases suggest that the parties’ choice to mediate and settle in
mediation shows respect for the difficulty of accurately predicting trial outcomes and
signals that the parties had sufficient information (including consideration of the neutral’s
opinion) to support a presumption of settlement reasonableness.93 “The completeness and
intensity of the mediation process,” reasoned one court, “coupled with the quality and
reputations of the Mediators, demonstrate a commitment by the Parties to a reasoned
process for conflict resolution that took into account the strengths and weaknesses of
their respective cases and the inherent vagaries of litigation.”94
Granted, the give and take in mediation is very helpful at exploring litigation risk.
And, truly effective mediation advocacy demands a high level of preparation that may
indeed signal a commitment to a reasoned process of conflict resolution. But surely
unfacilitated negotiation also provides an intensive exploration of risk for which class
action advocates prepare quite seriously.

92

EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 6 (1st ed. 1998).
See, e.g., Murillo v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., No. 2:08-1974 WBS GGH, 2010 WL 2889728, at *8
(E.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) (granting approval of final settlement and observing that “[t]he parties’ use of
third-party mediation also suggests that they had sufficient information about the claims to present their
arguments to an experienced mediator and considered a neutral opinion in evaluating the strength of their
arguments in this matter.”); In re Schering-Plough Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 01-CV-0829 (KSH/MF), 2009
WL 5218066, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 31, 2009) (reasoning that “[i]n choosing mediation rather than a jury trial,
the parties showed their respect for the difficulty of predicting a trial outcome given the matters in
contention: claims of security fraud and actionable misstatement that were strongly disputed, and nuanced
legal issues about scienter, loss causation, and the amount of damages” and concluding that “[g]iven all of
this, the settlement enjoys the presumption of reasonableness."); In re Veeco Instruments Inc. Sec. Litig.,
No. 05 MDL 01695 (CM), 2007 WL 4115809, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2007) (noting “both sides had
exchanged mediation statements which revealed the respective strengths and weaknesses of the claims and
defenses”).
94
Wilkerson v. Martin Marietta Corp., 171 F.R.D. 273, 285 (D. Colo. 1997).
93
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B. Mediation is Long and Hard
Still other cases emphasize that mediation is difficult, long, and hard-fought.95 For
example, in Pigford v. Glickman,96 mediator Michael Lewis offered the following
testimony:
If this case represented collusion or the negotiations in this case
represented collusion, I as a mediator never ever want to meet a case in
which the parties are at each other's throats. To term this negotiation
intensive…understates the difficulty. This was an arduous negotiation. It
took a year. It was hard fought.97
Parties simply would not work so hard, courts reason, if the goal was to collude against
the interests of non-party participants. As explained by one federal district court judge in
the Southern District of California:
The protracted and hard-fought nature of this case further militates against
the existence of collusion. It is highly unlikely that parties who seek to
collude would spend nearly a million dollars in costs (by Plaintiffs alone)
and devote thousands upon thousands of valuable attorney hours to the
matter. Rather, had the parties sought to collude, they would have been
much more likely to reach a collusive settlement as quickly and cheaply as
possible to minimize their costs and attorney time while maximizing their
personal recovery.98
A federal judge from the Northern District of Georgia made a similar argument in Ingram
v. Coca Cola Co.,99 reasoning that:
The fact that the entire mediation was conducted under the auspices of Mr.
Hughes, a highly experienced mediator, lends further support to the
absence of collusion. Indeed, it took all of Mr. Hughes’s skill to mediate
this settlement because it was so difficult to reach agreement between the

95

See, e.g., In re OCA, Inc. Sec. and Derivative Litig., No. 05-2165, 2009 WL 512081 (E.D. La.
March 2, 2009) (finding no evidence of fraud or collusion where mediator described the negotiating
process as a “long and difficult mediation in which counsel for all parties worked hard to represent the
interests of their clients.”); Gates v. Rohm And Haas Co., No. CIV.A.06-1743, 2008 WL 4078456 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 22, 2008) (characterizing the settlement as a “product of almost two years of contentious litigation
and months of negotiations, including two full days of mediation before an experienced mediator.”);
Quintanilla v. A & R Demolition Inc., No. CIV.A. H-04-1965, 2007 WL 5166849, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 7,
2007) (finding settlement free of fraud or collusion where it “was reached through arms-length negotiations
after a long, hard-fought mediation with a neutral.”).
96
Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999).
97
Id. at 101-102.
98
Shames v. Hertz Corp., No. 07-CV-2174-MMA WMC, 2012 WL 5392159, at *15 (S.D. Cal. Nov.5,
2012).
99
Ingram v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
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parties. Parties colluding in a settlement would hardly need the services of
a neutral third party to broker their deal.100
Finally, in In re Schering-Plough Corp. Securities Litig.,101 the federal district court for
the District of New Jersey noted that “[m]ediation sessions began years before the
ultimate settlement, foundered, recovered, gained traction, and were successful – a
pattern that demonstrates arms-length negotiating.”102
All well and good, but other courts routinely cite the failure of mediation to prove
lack of collusion and fraud for an agreement negotiated directly by the parties. “A
breakdown in settlement negotiations can tend to display the negotiation's arms-length
and non-collusive nature” reasoned the court in Hicks v. Stanley,103 explaining the
significance of an unsuccessful mediation. Likewise, in Ryan v. Gifford,104 the court
asserted that “multiple failed mediations demonstrate that the Settlement was reached
only after intensive arms-length negotiations between the parties.”105
C. The Mediator Made Me Do It: Mediator Proposals and the Use of Caucus
A number of courts highlight that settlement was reached because of a mediator
proposal.106 Typical is Lewis v. Vision Value, LLC,107 where the court concluded that a
proposed settlement “is not tainted by collusion,” where “the mediator issued a
mediator’s compromise which both sides accepted” and the “[m]ediator's compromise
was consistent with the range of Plaintiffs’ claim value.”108 In Hyland v. HomeServices of

100

Id. at 693.
In re Schering-Plough Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 01-CV-0829 (KSH/MF), 2009 WL 5218066 (D.N.J.
Dec. 31, 2009).
102
Id. at *3.
103
Hicks v. Stanley, No. 01 CIV. 10071 (RJH), 2005 WL 2757792, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2005).
104
Ryan v. Gifford, No. 2213-CC, 2009 WL 18143 (Del.Ch. Jan. 2, 2009).
105
Id. at *6. See also Gong-Chun v. Aetna Inc., No. 1:09-CV-01995-SKO, 2012 WL 2872788, at *12
(E.D. Cal. July 12, 2012) (finding the settlement to be the result of arms-length negotiation because
“[w]hile the action was not settled during the course of the mediation,” it “‘resulted in the narrowing of
issues related to class[-]wide liability and damages’”); Henley v. FMC Corp., 207 F. Supp. 2d 489,
493 (S.D. W.Va. 2002) (finding no indication of bad faith or collusion where “both sides diligently pursued
their respective positions since the inception of the case” and observing that “[t]estament to the parties'
previous intractable positions is the failure of a lengthy mediation conducted in Boston in advance of
the second trial to attempt a resolve the case.”).
106
See, e.g., Morales v. Stevco, Inc., No. 1:09–cv–00704 AWI JLT, 2011 WL 5511767, at *11 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 10, 2011) (deeming the settlement to be the product of non-collusive conduct, where the parties
utilized an impartial mediator and the matter was “resolved by means of a mediator’s proposal.”); Singer v.
Becton Dickinson & Co., No. 08-CV-821-IEG (BLM), 2010 WL 2196104, at *6 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2010)
(noting that the “proposed settlement in this case is the direct result of Mr. Grossman’s mediator proposal,
which was made to resolve the parties' impasse.”); Estate of Dolby, No. 8:03-cv-2246-T-23TGW, 2006 WL
2474062, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2006) (finding persuasive evidence of non-collusion where the
“settlement negotiations were initiated by the Eleventh Circuit and facilitated by an experienced Eleventh
Circuit mediator, who, according to both parties, encouraged the resolution.”).
107
Lewis v. Vision Value, LLC, No. 1:11-CV-01055-LJO, 2012 WL 2930867 (E.D. Cal. July 18,
2012).
108
Id. at *3.
101
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America, Inc.,109 the court justified approval of a controversial provision in a settlement
by noting it was suggested by the mediator and induced the defendants to settle, “thereby
conferring a benefit to the class.”110
At least one case seems to imply that arms-length negotiation is accomplished
physically – presumably by the mediator keeping the parties separated in caucuses.111
These “mediator made me do it” rationales fail for several reasons: First, they simply
ignore the possibility that the mediator could be knowingly or unknowingly involved in
selling short the absent class members. Indeed, as recommended in many well-respected
texts, mediators often offer their “own” proposals as a proxy for one authored by one of
the parties, as a way of overcoming the well-documented heuristic known as reactive
devaluation.112 Moreover, as observed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Olden v.
Gardner,113 the relationship of a mediator’s proposal to the terms of an ultimate
settlement says little about collusion (or lack of it) if the court is without specific
information to understand the basis of the mediator’s recommendation.
Second, caucused mediation indeed puts people “physically” at arms-length, but
is certainly no effective barrier against fraud, though it raises special concerns about how
evidence would be offered to prove it.114
D. The Mediator’s Duty to Stop Collusion and Fraud
Perhaps judges are assuming the mediators will exercise an ethical duty to stop
collusion and fraud. This rationale might be persuasive if there was such a duty. There is
not. Under the most widely known ethical code  the Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators – it is “highly desirable” but not mandatory for a mediator to promote honesty
and candor.115 According to the Model Standards Reporters’ Notes, this obligation:
[R]eflects the nuanced environment in which mediation occurs . . . [and]
acknowledges that resolving matters in mediation is not always predicated
109

Hyland v. HomeServices of Am., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-612-R, 2012 WL 1575310 (W.D. Ky. May 3,

2012).
110

Id. at *5.
See Rolland v. Cellucci, 191 F.R.D. 3, 6 (D. Mass. 2000) (including the somewhat cryptic report
that “[i]ndeed, the court is given to understand that the parties were kept at significantly greater than arms
length during the course of mediation.”).
112
See, e.g., COLE ET AL., supra note 3 at § 3:13; JENNIFER K. ROBBENNHOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT,
PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND
DECISION MAKING 298 (2012); JOSEPH B. STULBERG & LELA LOVE, THE MIDDLE VOICE: MEDIATING
CONFLICT SUCCESSFULLY 13637 (2009).
113
Olden v. Gardner, 294 F. App’x 210, 219 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming trial court class action
settlement approval as close call, and specifically noting that fact that mediator's recommended settlement
was less than value eventually agreed upon was not decisive on lack of collusion given that the basis of the
mediator's recommendation was unclear).
114
See, e.g., Murray v. Talmage, 151 P.3d 49 (Mont. 2006) (granting a new trial to the plaintiff note
holder in an airplane security agreement dispute, based on improper admission of defendant debtor’s
testimony about what the mediator said in caucus which the court deemed prejudicial hearsay).
115
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard VI(A)(4)(2005) (“A mediator should
promote honesty and candor between and among all participants, and a mediator shall not knowingly
misrepresent any material fact or circumstance in the course of a mediation.”).
111
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on their having been complete honesty and candor among those present.
To state the matter differently, while mediation participants might engage
in negotiating tactics such as bluffing or exaggerating that are designed to
deceive other parties as to their acceptable positions, a mediator must not
knowingly misrepresent material fact or circumstances in order to advance
settlement discussions.116
Implicit in this approach is the idea that the mediator can control his or her own
behavior, but not that of the participants. As Ellen Waldman puts it in her 2011 book on
mediation ethics:
[I]mposing a duty to speak on mediators, is, however, a dicey business.
Mediators encourage parties to lower defenses and increase information
exchange by promising to serve as discrete interlocutors. This translation
function does not include serving as fact checker or truth monitor.
Moreover confidentiality strictures preclude mediators from revealing
information told to them in confidence. Rather than expect mediators to
take it on themselves to set the record straight, it is more realistic to look
to them as truth cheerleaders who encourage parties toward probity.117
Even where mediation is being used to further criminal conduct, the Model
Standards state that mediators “should” (not “shall”)118 “take appropriate steps, including,
if necessary, postponing, withdrawing from or terminating the mediation.”119 The drafters
of the Model Standards expressly refused to adopt an obligation to affirmatively report
illegal conduct, preferring instead to reserve flexibility to respond to such situations
because of the subtlety of such matters and also out of concerns that confidentiality laws
and agreements might prohibit reporting.120
116

MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard VI(A)(4), Reporters’ Notes H3

(2005).
117

ELLEN WALDMAN, MEDIATION ETHICS: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 202 (2011).
The Model Standards define these terms as follows:
The use of the term “shall” in a Standard indicates that the mediator must follow the
practice described. The use of the term “should” indicates that the practice described in
the standard is highly desirable, but not required, and is to be departed from only for very
strong reasons and requires careful use of judgment and discretion. MODEL STANDARDS
OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Note on Construction.
119
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard VI(A)(9) (2005).
120
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard VI(A)(9), Reporters’ Notes H5 (2005)
which provides:
[The standard] . . . guides a mediator who confronts mediation participants using mediation to
further criminal conduct, not simply illegal conduct, to take appropriate steps to deter them from
accomplishing that goal. Several public comments suggested that the mediator’s duty in such a
situation was to affirmatively report such conduct to appropriate legal authorities. The Joint
Committee rejected that suggestion for two reasons. First, , the subtlety of such matters –
including there being multi-issue cases in which only one issue raised a specter of criminal
conduct – requires that a mediator be firm but flexible in addressing such a situation; second,
confidentiality laws or agreements may prevent it, such that unless there were an exception in the
confidentiality agreement for this situation or a mediator had a duty to report such conduct, a
mediator might expose himself or herself to liability by reporting such conduct.
118
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E. The Mediator’s Duty to Protect Third Parties
Judges might also be assuming that mediators have a duty to protect third parties,
or at the very least to “police” the substantive fairness of the agreements. There is no
such duty.121 As succinctly summarized by Ellen Waldman:
The [Model] standards are silent on the matter of substantive fairness. This
is astonishing when one reflects that mediators are, after all, in the business
of helping bring disputes to closure and that one fairly uncontroversial goal
society might hold for its dispute resolvers is to work toward agreements
that are fair and just.122
Instead, ethical aspirations are entirely focused on process, not substance.123 As Joseph
Stulberg forcefully advocated in one of the earliest academic exchanges about mediator
accountability, “a mediator must be neutral with regard to outcome” because neutrality as
to outcome is imperative to the trust necessary for the parties to realize that they “have
nothing to lose and everything to gain by the mediator’s intervention.”124 From this
perspective, still a dominant one in mediation circles more than three decades after it was
posited, nothing the mediator does “could jeopardize or abridge the substantive interests
of the respective parties.”125
F. Deterrence: The Mediator as Witness
Having a third party in the negotiation room who could potentially be a witness to
collusion and fraud is another possible justification for the presumption of mediation’s
value on the arms-length bargaining issue. Obviously, the presence of a possible adverse
witness could operate as a powerful deterrent to misconduct.
There are several problems with this rationale. First, as a threshold matter, no
confidentiality schemes expressly permit an exception to mediation confidentiality for
mediator evidence on the quality of bargaining in class actions.126 Moreover, while some
confidentiality statutes provide an exception to mediation confidentiality for civil fraud in
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See infra notes 180200 and accompanying text in section VI for detailed discussion of judicial
opinions reaching the same conclusion.
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WALDMAN, supra note 117, at 115.
123
Id. at 116.
124
Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L.
REV. 85, 96 (1981).
125
Id. For a review of alternative perspectives on substantive justice in mediation, see James R. Coben,
Gollum, Meet Sméagol: A Schizophrenic Rumination on Mediator Values Beyond Self Determination and
Neutrality, 5 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 65, 78-85 (Spring 2004). See also Robert A. Baruch Bush &
Joseph P. Folger, Mediation and Social Justice: Risks and Opportunities, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1
(2012); Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia Were a Mediator: An Inquiry into Justice in
Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 157 (2002).
126
See COLE ET AL., supra note 3, at § 8:25 (noting that while “no state statute provides an express
exception, it is accepted practice in class action fairness hearings that the parties and, frequently, the
mediators will report to the court about what went on during the mediation.”).
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addition to criminal acts,127 many do not, including the Uniform Mediation Act.
According to the UMA reporters’ notes:
While ready to exempt attempts to commit or the commission of crimes
from confidentiality protection, the Drafting Committees declined to cover
"fraud" that would not also constitute a crime because civil cases
frequently include allegations of fraud, with varying degrees of merit, and
the mediation would appropriately focus on discussion of fraud claims.128
Putting aside any limitations posed by affirmative prohibitions on mediator
disclosure,129 it is true that in many jurisdictions with privilege approaches to mediation
confidentiality, it would be possible for the parties and the mediator to waive
confidentiality protection.130 Of course, this waiver option would be unavailable in
jurisdictions where the mediator is deemed “incompetent” to testify.131
Of course, there is a far more practical problem. If there actually was collusion or
fraud, it is hard to imagine that the required mutual waivers of privilege would occur. The
parties who agreed to the settlement certainly will not choose to undermine it. And is it
realistic to expect that the mediator, who labored long and hard to broker the settlement
(and was paid handsomely by the parties to do so), will volunteer to testify against it?
Indeed, it comes as no surprise that there is not a single case where class objectors
offered up the mediator’s affidavit, declaration, or deposition testimony to support an
argument about the infirmities in the bargaining process or unreasonableness of the
settlement.
In fact, class objectors face significant hurdles getting access to information about
the mediation process beyond the now routine positive declarations of success.132 As
emphasized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, “[s]ettlement negotiations involve
sensitive matters” and discovery is warranted “‘only where the party seeking it lays a
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See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23–3505 (2006) (providing that confidentiality protections do not
apply to “any information that is reasonably necessary to stop the commission of an ongoing crime or fraud
or to prevent the commission of a crime or fraud in the future for which there was an expressed intent to
commit such crime or fraud.”); N.D. CENT CODE § 31-04-11(1) (1989) (providing no restriction on
compulsion or admissibility of evidence that “relates to a crime, civil fraud, or a violation under the
Uniform Juvenile Court Act.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19–13–32 (1998) (deeming privilege inapplicable
“if the communication was made in furtherance of a crime or fraud”).
128
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(a)(4), cmt. 5.
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See supra notes 126128 and accompanying text.
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See generally COLE ET AL., supra note 3, at § 8:29. For example, under UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 5,
waivers of privilege are permitted if expressly made by all parties (and in the case of a privilege of the
mediator, also with the express waiver by the mediator) and recorded or made orally during proceedings.
See generally, COLE ET AL., supra note 3, at § 8:13.
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See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(a) (2008) (deeming a mediator incompetent to testify
except to statements or conduct that could constitute a crime, give rise to attorney disqualification
proceedings, or constitute professional misconduct).
132
See generally NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 10, at § 11:57 (noting that “[t]he objector
does not have an absolute right to discovery and presentation of evidence.”).
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foundation by adducing from other sources evidence indicating that the settlement may
be collusive.’”133
This is a formidable “Catch-22.” A rare favorable decision in favor of class
objectors came in a 2012 decision of the Montana Supreme Court. In Pallister v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Montana,134 the court vacated approval of a mediated class
action settlement and ordered discovery of settlement negotiations after concluding that
the state’s confidentiality statute did not apply to bar objectors from receiving
information from class plaintiffs with whom they were aligned. A vigorous dissent
suggested, like the trial court, that the mediator was in the best position to state
“objectively” whether the agreement was “free of collusion.”135 Moreover, in even
raising the concerns, reasoned the dissent, the objectors were inappropriately
“disparaging” the mediator.136 In other words, “how dare they!”
V. DEALING IN VIRTUE: THE UNEXPRESSED ASSUMPTION UNDERLYING DEFERENCE
“They are purportedly selected for their ‘virtue’ – judgment, neutrality,
expertise – yet rewarded as if they are participants in . . . deal-making.”
(Yves Dezalay & and Bryant G. Garth)137
When all is said and done, none of the attributes of mediation offered above –
even if they were explicitly articulated (and they were not) – adequately explain why trial
courts are so comfortable claiming that mediation alone is proof of arms-length
bargaining and lack of collusion and fraud. Nor can these attributes fully justify why
judges so readily defer to the mediators’ assessment of the quality of class action
bargaining (and in many cases, as described above, the quality and adequacy of the
settlement reached).
There is, however, one unexpressed assumption that is infused throughout the
judicial opinions: Class action mediators are members of a small fraternity highly
respected by the judiciary.138 Though class action judicial opinions typically say little
133

Lobatz v. U.S. West Cellular of California, Inc., 222 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Mars
Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 684 (7th Cir. 1987)). Accord Thornton
v. Syracuse Sav. Bank, 961 F.2d 1042, 1046 (2d Cir. 1992).
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Pallister v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana, 285 P.3d 562 (Mont. 2012).
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Id. at 574 (Morris, J. dissenting).
136
Id.
137
See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 1, at 8 (describing international arbitrators, but as argued supra
at note 2 and in accompanying text, could just as easily describe the small, elite group of private mediators
who are regularly chosen in class action cases).
138
Indeed, given how frequently the class action mediators are former judges (sometimes even former
colleagues of the judge presiding over the case), it would appear that it is a small fraternity that the
decision-makers may themselves have hope to someday join. See, e.g., Lucken Family L.P., LLLP v. Ultra
Resources, Inc., No. 09-CV-01543-REB-KMT, 2010 WL 2650037, at *3 (D. Colo. June 30, 2010) (noting
input and assistance of former judge, now a “respected and qualified mediator”); In re Apple Computer,
Inc. Derivative Litig., No. C 06-4128 JF (HRL), 2008 WL 4820784, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2008)
(highlighting participation of “a former magistrate judge of this court” as weighing “considerably against
any inference of a collusive settlement”); Miracle v. Bullitt County, Ky., No. CIV.A. 05-130-C, 2008 WL
4974799, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 19, 2008) (observing that mediation was conducted by a former judge
“who knows the obligation of the court in overseeing class action settlements”); In re System Software
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about the mediation process beyond the summary statements illustrated above, the
opinions are chock full of superlatives when it comes to describing the mediator and his
or her qualifications.
A. Members of the Club: Respected, Experienced, and Well-Versed in the Law
Mediators have been described as “highly regarded”;139 “prominent”;140 and
independent141. Respect is a common refrain, including “respected”;142 “highly
respected”;143 “respected and fully informed”;144 “well respected and experienced”;145 or
“respected and impartial.”146
Knowledge of the court’s burden is highly valued. For example, in Miracle v.
Bullitt County, Kentucky, the federal district court judge emphasized that the experienced
mediator, a former judge, “knows the obligations of the Court in overseeing class action
settlements of this kind.”147
The alternative ways judges emphasize mediator experience are dazzling,
including use of the words “experienced”;148 “extremely experienced”;149 “highly
experienced”;150 “extensive experience”;151 “experienced and neutral”;152 “experienced
Assoc., Inc., No. 97 C 177, 2000 WL 283099, at *9 (N.D. Ill. March 8, 2000) (emphasizing that
“negotiations were mediated by an objective outsider,” a former Appellate Court Justice).
139
In re Marsh ERISA Litig., 265 F.R.D. 128, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Schering-Plough Corp. Sec.
Litig., No. 01-CV-0829 (KSH/MF), 2009 WL 5218066 at *3(D.N.J. Dec. 31, 2009); Schwartz v. TXU
Corp., No. 3:02-CV-2255, 3:02-CV-2279, 3:02-CV-2322, 3:02-CV-2328, 3:02-CV-2339, 3:02-CV-2360,
3:02-CV-2334, 3:02-CV-2343, 3:02-CV-2366, 3:02-CV-2243-K, 3:02-CV-2337, 3:02-CV-2346, 3:02-CV2438, 3:02-CV-2471, 3:03-CV-0289, 3:03-CV-0290, 3:02-CV-2248, 3:02-CV-2416, 3:02-CV-2262, 3:02CV-2315, 3:02-CV-2270, 3:02-CV-2600, 3:02-CV-2450, 3:02-CV-2525, 3:02-CV-2739, 3:02-CV-2586,
3:02-CV-2458, 3:02-CV-2689, 3:02-CV-2314, 2005 WL 3148350, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2005).
140
Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 652, 666 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
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Bert v. AK Steel Corp., No. 1:02-CV-467, 2008 WL 4693747, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2008).
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Farinella v. Paypal, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 250, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Becher v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 64 F. Supp. 2d 174, 181 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
143
In re Sterling Foster & Co., Inc., Nos. 99 CV 2789(ADS)(MLO), 97 CV 189(ADS)(MLO), 97 CV
610(ADS)(MLO), 97 CV 1689(ADS)(MLO), 97 CV 3253(ADS)(MLO), 97 CV 3775(ADS)(MLO), 2006
WL 3193744, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31 2006).
144
In re Aquila ERISA Litig., No. 04-00865-CV-DW, 2007 WL 4244994, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 29,
2007).
145
Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 594 (3d Cir. 2010).
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Esslinger v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., No. CIV.A. 10-3213, 2012 WL 5866074, at *8 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 20, 2012).
147
Miracle v. Bullitt Cnty., Ky., No. CIV.A. 05-130-C, 2008 WL 4974799, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 19,
2008).
148
See, e.g., Adoma v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., No. CIV. S-10-0059 LKK/GGH, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1142,
2012 WL 6651141, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2012); Toure v. Amerigroup Corp., No. 10 CIV. 5391 RLM,
2012 WL 1432302, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2012); Diaz v. Eastern Locating Serv. Inc., No. 10 CIV 4082
JCF, 2010 WL 2945556, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2010); Satchell v. Fed. Express Corp., Nos. C03-2659 SI,
C 03-2878 SI, 2007 WL 1114010, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr.13, 2007); Estate of Dolby, No. 8:03-cv-2246-T23TGW, 2006 WL 2474062, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2006).
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Hanlon v. Palace Entm’t Holdings, LLC, CIV.A. No. 11-987, 2012 WL 27461, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Jan.
3, 2012).
150
Ingram v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 693 (N.D. Ga. 2001); In re Toys R Us Antitrust Litig.,
191 F.R.D. 347, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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and well regarded”;153 “experienced and reputable”;154 “experienced and well known”;155
“experienced and well-qualified”;156 and “experienced and respected.”157 Pity the poor
soul referred to only as a “skilled ADR practitioner.”158
Still other judges choose to emphasize mediators’ legal expertise, most commonly
deeming them “well versed” in the relevant law.159 It certainly does not hurt to be
“nationally recognized.”160 But “one of the nation’s most respected mediators”161 is
arguably even better.
All of this approbation fails utterly in the face of “indisputably exquisitely
qualified” – praise reserved for mediator William Webster in Cook v. Powell Buick,
Inc.,162 a 1998 Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision. There, the court cited Webster’s
testimony as particularly important in establishing “beyond peradventure” that
interveners were adequately represented by the existing parties and class counsel.163
You might think that “beyond peradventure” could be getting close to the limits
of deference that trial court judges give to mediator conclusions. The prize however
belongs to a Western District of Pennsylvania judge’s description of a former colleague,
now mediator, in a protracted class action battle about an alleged illegal home equity
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Stratton v. Glacier Ins. Adm'r, Inc., No. 1:02-CV-06213 OWW DLB, 2007 WL 274423, at *14
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191 F.R.D. 347, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting mediator’s background in antitrust law); In re Marsh ERISA
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lending scheme.164 Deeming the settlement entitled to a presumption of fairness based on
the mediator’s testimony, the court offered up the following:
This court took no role in the parties’ retention of Judge Lewis as a
mediator to facilitate the settlement. Indeed, the court was not aware of his
involvement until after the fact. However, Judge Lewis is well known to
the court, having served on this court as well as the court of appeals, with
distinction. His integrity is beyond reproach and no credible attack has
been, or could be, lodged against his assurances.165
“Case closed, end of discussion.”166
B. A Poor Match: Private Selection, Public Responsibility
“Case closed, end of discussion,” might work for rapper Eminem (particularly in a
song accompanied with a strong parental advisory warning of explicit content).167 But
successful class action mediations yield settlements with profound implications for absent
class members. As eloquently stated by dissenting Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
Jeffrey Smith in In re Asbestos Litigation:168
The difficulty inherent in assessing the substantive fairness of a settlement
makes prophylactic procedural protections crucial to the protection of
absent plaintiffs. The range of “fair” settlements is wide in any case, and
settlement classes present unique opportunities for collusion between class
counsel and defendants. Once the machinery of a settlement class action is
set in motion, the judiciary has a very hard time controlling it; thus, it is
critical that we craft that machinery well.169
In his dissent, Judge Smith took the majority to task for affirming denial of a motion to
recuse the trial court judge who mediated a class action settlement and then conducted a
fairness hearing on the same settlement. The majority, like many courts hearing the same
challenge, 170 found no reasonable basis to question the judge’s impartiality.171
164

In re Cmty. Bank of Northern Virginia, NO. MDL 1674, 03-0425, 2008 WL 3833271 (W.D. Pa.,
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See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Sunwest Mgmt., Inc., No. 09–6056–HO, 2009 WL 1065053, at *2 (D. Or. Apr.
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facts gained in the process); Garrett v. Delta Queen Steamboat Co., Inc., No. 05-1492-CJB-SS, 2007 WL
837177, at *3 (E.D. La. March 14, 2007) (noting that if recusal was warranted “then any judge or
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Yet, as noted by Judge Smith, proof of actual bias is not necessary before
impartiality can reasonably be questioned.172 In Judge Smith’s view:
Having helped to craft the settlement, Chief Judge Parker had a personal
stake in finding it to be fair: A determination that the settlement was unfair
would imply that he had acted unfairly in helping to craft it. In light of
these facts, a person might reasonably conclude that Chief Judge Parker,
despite his dedicated and painstaking efforts, probably developed a natural
bias in favor of his own work.173
The same “natural bias” might well color a private mediator’s characterization of the
virtues of the bargaining process he or she supervised, not to mention settlement quality.
Indeed, the stakes are arguably even higher for the private mediator, than for the
reviewing judge: Only the former’s paycheck is potentially linked to settlement approval;
class action mediators who do not successfully assist parties to settle cases are unlikely to
be hired.
But why not rely on the virtue, the selflessness, of the mediator to protect against
this threat? When all is said and done, they are not the ultimate arbiters of any parties’
rights so the procedural due process concerns are conceivably significantly less than
those present when evaluating judicial or arbitral impartiality.174
However, while the procedural due process concerns are certainly reduced, they
are by no means eliminated. While mediators arguably lack decision-making power, the
power they do exercise is unguided by the formalities of procedure and rules. Indeed, the
possibility of bias (and the appearance of bias) is compounded by the very informality
that is one of mediation’s primary characteristics. And this informality becomes
especially troubling in the class action mediation context when it comes to the selective

magistrate judge who conducted a settlement conference would be precluded in all such cases from
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See generally, Richard Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
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nature of information emerging from it.175 Fundamentally, the intersection of private
rights (the parties’ choice to have the mediator they want and the process they want) does
not mesh neatly with the public rights at stake in the class action settlement approval
process – the necessity to protect the interests of the absent class members.176 And at this
intersection lies a fundamental unfairness when judges defer too much to the mediator’s
perception of fairness in process and outcome. Even if this unfairness does not reach
constitutional dimensions, it certainly has the potential to erode the public perception of
procedural justice,177 especially from the perspective of the absent class member (and
potential objector).
At the simplest of levels, we are, in the gendered language of John Adams, “a
government of laws, not of men,”178 – no matter how respected, virtuous, and
experienced those individuals might be. As aptly stated by bankruptcy court Judge Kevin
J. Carey, Jr., a “proposed settlement must stand or fall on its own merits and is not
dependent upon the identity of the Mediator.”179 There are at least some judges who have
wisely reached the same conclusion in the context of class action cases.
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VI. LONE VOICES
DEFERENCE

OF

REASON: THE UNCOMMON JUDICIAL ARGUMENT AGAINST

“It is . . . no answer to say that a private mediator helped frame the
proposal. Such a mediator is paid to help the immediate parties reach a
deal. Mediators do not adjudicate the merits. They are masters in the art
of what is negotiable. It matters little to the mediator whether a deal is
collusive as long as a deal is reached. Such a mediator has no fiduciary
duty to anyone, much less those not at the table.”
(The Honorable William Alsup)180
To date, California federal district court Judge William Alsup is the only jurist to
so explicitly state an obvious truth – the complete lack of private mediator responsibility
for class action settlement outcome. Like most things, his unusually blunt
characterization is easier to understand in context. In Kakani v. Oracle,181 Judge Alsup
was asked by class action parties to preliminarily approve a mediated settlement
purporting to fully resolve a class action brought on behalf of Oracle employees who
alleged they had been systematically deprived of overtime pay because of the employer’s
mischaracterization of their status as exempt employees. In Judge Alsup’s words, the
mediated settlement was a “bonanza” for the company and for class counsel. Among
other things:
1) payments from the nationwide settlement fund that were unclaimed by
class members were retained by the company, while plaintiff’s counsel
would receive $2.25 million regardless of how many claims were
actually submitted by class members;
2) California class members would receive at least twice as much as nonCalifornia plaintiffs;
3) the settlement provided an extraordinarily short period of time for
workers to claim benefits under the settlement;
4) a proposed Fair Labor Standards Act release was not limited to those
employees who affirmatively opt-in to the settlement but extended to
all eligible class members; and
5) the negotiated release was ambiguous with respect to class members’
waiver of state law claims other than those brought under California
state law.182
180
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In the face of such fundamental unfairness, correctly reasoned the judge, the
mediator’s stamp of approval meant nothing.183 He denied the settlement, rescheduled a
hearing on the parties’ pending motion for class certification, but also reserved hearing
time to permit the parties to attempt renewed settlement dialogue. Several weeks later
when presented with a revised settlement curing the obvious deficiencies of the earlier
mediated version, Judge Alsup deemed the revised settlement “sufficiently fair and
reasonable for absent class members” to warrant “at least preliminary approval.”184
Other courts have raised similar doubts about the value of mediator involvement,
though none with the sense of outrage Judge Alsup marshaled to the task. For example, in
Acosta v. Trans Union,185 the trial court took a much kinder approach to discounting
mediator endorsement of a settlement. There, in denying class action settlement approval,
the court lauded the mediator’s involvement in the case but delicately pointed out that he
was essentially duped by the parties into believing that hard trade-offs were made during
the mediation process he brokered and wholeheartedly endorsed, when in fact, the tradeoffs had been negotiated secretly by the parties before the mediation even began.186
In In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litig.,187 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated district court approval of a class action attorney fee award and mediated
settlement where the gross disproportion between the class award and the negotiated fee
award raised at least an inference of unfairness, and the record failed to “adequately
dispel the possibility that class counsel bargained away a benefit to the class in exchange
for their own interests.”188 The appellate court pointed out that “the mere presence of a
neutral mediator, though a factor weighing in favor of a finding of non-collusiveness, is
not on its own dispositive of whether the end product is a fair, adequate, and reasonable
settlement agreement.”189
Some thirteen years earlier in Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,190 the Ninth Circuit
directly addressed a class objector’s contention that the trial court gave so much weight to
the mediation proceedings that there had been an effective abrogation of the court’s duty
15(b)). The chance that notice by mail would really reach all workers is very remote,
especially since many are former workers and have scattered to the winds, yet the release
would be absolute and universal. From practical experience, the Court is confident that a
significant proportion of all workers would not submit timely claims. No doubt, this is what
the company is counting on to reduce its exposure. No doubt, this is also why counsel want a
fee based on the theoretical maximum payout rather than the actual benefit conferred. Id. at
*6.
183
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to independently adjudicate whether a fee award was proper.191 Though the reviewing
court rejected the abrogation argument, it did assert that the court, not the mediator, has
the primary responsibility to guard against collusion.192 In the court’s view, the trial judge
had merely (and permissibly) relied on the mediator “as independent confirmation that
the fee was not the result of collusion or a sacrifice of the interests of the class, an inquiry
the court was required to make.”193
Citing Hanlon, the Eastern District of California federal district court in 2008
emphasized that “[t]he fact that the parties reached an agreement before an experienced
mediator, while commendable, does not preclude a detailed review of the settlement
terms.”194 Similarly, in In re Mfrs. Life Ins.,195 the court specifically rejected the
plaintiffs’ assertion that deference must be given to the mediator’s “thorough and careful
consideration” of a fee question, instead citing Hanlon for the proposition that the
mediator’s findings and conclusions “may be used only to confirm this Court's own
analysis.”196
Finally, what about mediator Kenneth Feinberg’s sworn declaration, quoted
earlier in this article, that the parties’ resolution of their “very complex matter . . . is the
fairest resolution which could be obtained?”197 In In re Literary Works in Electronic
Databases Copyright Litig.,198 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the trial
court’s approval of that “fairest resolution,” and stated:
The participation of impartial mediators and institutional plaintiffs does
not compensate for the absence of independent representation. Although
the mediators safeguarded the negotiation process, and the institutional
plaintiffs watched out for the interests of the class as a whole, no one
advanced the strongest arguments in favor of Category C's recovery.199
However, as I transition to this article’s closing section on recommendations, it is
worth noting that not all judges on the Second Circuit panel were so inclined to prune
back the deference owed to class action mediators. As dissenter Judge Chester J. Staub
put it:
These negotiations...occurred under the direction of an impartial mediator
who could search out each party's respective strengths and weaknesses,
advise them to adjust their positions accordingly, and vouch that each side
191
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fully represented its clients to the best of its ability…. The participation of
mediator Feinberg in this case, while by no means ensuring fully adequate
representation, does make it more likely that the parties reached the limits
of compromise.200

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
“There are certain labels in this country that are very, very critical.”
(Former Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson)201
Tinkering with the presumptions judges make about mediator participation in
class action settlement is certainly an option for change. A “pruning” of deference is
certainly warranted. When describing the impact of mediator involvement, courts could
be called upon to substitute the sweeping use of terms such as “insures”202 or
“confirms”203 the quality of bargaining and lack of collusion with less categorical
pronouncements such as “reinforces,”204 which implies confirmation of the court’s
independent judgment and exercise of its fiduciary duty on behalf of absent class
members. The problem with mere pruning is that courts are not expressly deferring in the
first place. Instead, they are exercising an implicit, ill-defined, and unreasoned form of
deference. Well-established class action principles give trial court judges the sole
responsibility to determine that a settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate”;205 no
appellate decision suggests that a trial court judge may defer to anyone on this ultimate
responsibility. Yet courts routinely, but implicitly, do so. “Pruning” deference when
deference is not overtly acknowledged as happening is unlikely to be an effective
solution.
A more concrete possibility: If and when mediator evidence is offered, courts
should insist on objective evidence, rather than opinion-infused subjective declarations.
This would, theoretically at least, increase the possibility that trial judges would render
their “fair, reasonable, and adequate” determinations on evidence, rather than simply the
“pronouncements” of the virtuous neutral.206
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Better by far is to appoint class action mediators as special masters under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 53 (or state equivalent). Authority to do so is well established.207
Doing so would solve a number of problems. First, by appointing the mediator as a
special master, the court could invest the master with the same express fiduciary duty that
it itself holds to protect the interests of the absent class members.208
Second, the settlement appointment would carry with it a systematic approach to
reporting of mediator conclusions about the quality of the bargaining and merits of
settlement. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(e),209 the appointing court’s order
could require findings and conclusions to be drafted and submitted to the court for review
in all cases, not simply in response to outside objectors’ concerns.
Third, the order appointing a master must state the nature of the materials to be
preserved and filed as a record of the master’s activities,210 and state the reporting
requirements and standards for reviewing the masters’ findings and recommendations.211
This would be a vast improvement over the current haphazard approach for compiling
and reporting mediator evidence, and establishes a form of “transparency and
accountability” likely to improve procedural fairness in class action settlement approval
decision-making.212
Moreover, there is an added benefit to appointing mediators as special masters,
that flows from the significance of the “label” attached to the work. In “traditional”
settlement-oriented mediation, neutrals use all of their skills to assist the parties to resolve
their dispute but the mediator is never a post-settlement public endorser and promoter of
the resolution reached. Nor is it expected by the parties, the judicial system, or the public
that mediators would routinely provide evidence to the court about the quality of the
parties’ bargaining or merits of their settlement. Class action mediators are called upon to
do something quite different. They too facilitate the bargaining, but then are often
expected to report to the court on the quality of the bargaining, and in many cases, the
quality of the settlement. Without formal appointment to do so, and without any duty
owed to the most vulnerable participants in the process – the absent class members – the
class action mediator profoundly influences the ultimate legal conclusion in a settled
class action case: Whether the settlement was “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”213
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At the front end of this process, the “label” mediator might make sense. But at the
back end, the “label” mediator has nothing to do with what the class action neutral is
called upon to do. “Labels,” as former solicitor general Theodore Olson reminded us in a
recent Supreme Court oral argument,214 matter. And a far better “label” for a class action
mediator would be “special master.”
VIII. CONCLUSION
The February 22, 2013 symposium ended with an impassioned plea from
Professor Thomas Carbonneau for more deference rather than less in the context of
arbitration:
[A]rbitration is not perfection but it is certainly a better way to live. . . .
Functionality vs. appeal: That’s the whole point here today. Should the
courts tell arbitrators how to rule? Or when they got it wrong? My answer
is clearly no. Because there aren’t enough cases where the arbitrators will
be wrong in order to subvert the entire system.215
Should we apply the same substantial deference to class action mediators?
Undoubtedly, they too are “virtuous” people, members of a very select group chosen
because of their “judgment, neutrality, expertise,” – their “symbolic power.”216
When it comes to the illusion of truth, repetition of the mantra that mediator
participation ensures fairness and settlement quality is only effective “when people are
paying little attention.”217 Agree or disagree with my particular conclusions and
recommendations, but above all else, please look closely at this little niche of excessive
implied deference; it merits far closer examination and thoughtful critique than it has
received to date.
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